This report outlines a pro-poor, em ploym ent-focused econom ic policy fram ew ork for South A frica. Its specific focus is the severe problem of m ass unem ploym ent in South A frica today. Unem ploym ent w as betw een 26.5 and 40.5 percent as of M arch 2005, depending on w hether one uses the 'official' or 'expanded' definition of unem ploym ent (w ith the expanded definition including so-called 'discouraged w orkers'). The paper's concentration on the problem of m ass unem ploym ent is fully consistent w ith the stated goals of the current A frican National Congress (A NC) governm ent. A t the G row th and Developm ent Sum m it in 2003, President Thabo M beki singled out "m ore jobs, better jobs, and decent w ork for all" as one of the country's four key econom ic challenges. Currently, the prelim inary presentations of the G overnm ent's new econom ic policy fram ew ork, the "A ccelerated and Shared G row th Initiative for South A frica (A SG ISA )-indicate that it affirm s its com m itm ent to cutting the unem ploym ent rate by half by 2014.
This publication is a sum m ary of the full report (w hich is on the w ebsite of the Political Econom y Research Institute: w w w .um ass.edu/peri). Follow ing an introductory first section, the full report consists of tw o short sections that lay out basic concerns, then tw o substantially longer sections presenting the fram ew ork for policy analysis and specific policy proposals.
Section 2 presents evidence on the scope of the unem ploym ent problem in South A frica today, considering the unem ployed by gender, race, region, length of joblessness and age. It then exam ines how the country's problem of m ass unem ploym ent can be usefully conceptualized in sim ple accounting term s-nam ely, as the result of 1) insufficiency in the rate of output grow th, i.e., the econom y's production of goods and services, and 2) a declining num ber of jobs being created per unit of output.
Section 3 exam ines supply-side perspectives on em ploym ent expansion. The fact that the South A frican econom y is experiencing both high unem ploym ent and rising capital intensity of production suggests to som e analysts both an explanation for high unem ploym ent and a solution to the problem . For these analysts, the explanation for the problem is straightforw ard: businesses w ill not hire m ore w orkers because they are convinced that the costs of doing so w ill exceed the benefits. Businesses therefore choose to either 1) m aintain their operations at a low er level than they w ould if the benefits of hiring m ore w orkers exceeded the costs or 2) increase the use of m achines in their operations as a substitute for em ploying w orkers as their preferred m eans of expanding their operations. Seen from this perspective, the solution to the problem of unem ploym ent is also straightforw ard: low er the costs that businesses face in hiring m ore w orkers.
In general, there are four possible w ays in w hich the costs to businesses of hiring w orkers could fall: 1) w orkers receive low er overall com pensation, including w ages and benefits 2) the industrial relations system and labor m arket regulations-including law s and regulations regarding w orkers' rights to organize, conflict resolution, and hiring and firing-operate w ith m ore flexibility for business 3) w orkers perform their w orkplace operations at a higher level of productivity or 4) the governm ent absorbs som e portion of the costs of hiring w orkers. In m ost discussions that consider the sources of unem ploym ent from this business cost-oriented perspective, the focus generally is on the first w ay to reduce business costs, i.e., to low er w ages and benefits for w orkers relative to both other input costs for production and the prices at w hich businesses can sell their final products. This study argues that the evidence linking m ass unem ploym ent to high labor costs is not persuasive. W e also argue that w age cutting as a policy approach is certain to elicit strong resistance, w hich in turn w ill w orsen the country's investm ent clim ate. A t the sam e tim e, w e do indeed support m easures to m aintain w age increases in line w ith productivity grow th and to im prove the efficiency of the industrial relations system . This report also introduces a proposal for a hybrid program of credit and em ploym ent subsidies as a m eans through w hich the G overnm ent can effectively absorb a share of businesses' labor costs.
Section 4 of the report considers the dem and-side forces in South A frica's econom y that w ill need to be m obilized to achieve faster econom ic grow th and greater labor intensity. In term s of grow th, the report discusses all four com ponents of the conventional national incom e identity that, taken together, define econom ic grow th-i.e., private investm ent, private consum ption, net exports, and governm ent spending. The report places particular stress in this section on the grow th-enhancing effects of expanding public infrastructure investm ents. Indeed, public investm ent could expand both output and private sector productivity, and could correspondingly increase private investm ent and export com petitiveness. It is significant that the A SG ISA program also em phasizes the need for expanded public investm ent.
In considering w ays to increase the labor intensity of grow th, the report exam ines tw o basic approaches. The first is the Expanded Public W orks Program (EPW P) now being im plem ented by the national governm ent. The second approach is to encourage accelerated grow th in business activities w ithin South A frica that are capable of generating large increases in em ploym ent. The report exam ines the relative labor intensity of various industries in South A frica as w ell as the 'em ploym ent m ultipliers' of industries, i.e., their capacity to generate relatively large num bers of new jobs through their upstream links w ith other business firm s in the country.
Section 5, w hich concludes the report, considers specific policy tools that can be deployed to prom ote faster grow th, rising labor intensity and greater poverty reduction. It considers policy interventions in the follow ing areas: fiscal policy, m onetary policy, credit subsidies, and developm ent banking; capital m arket and exchange rate controls; inflation control; and sectoral policies in the areas of a) m onopolistic pricing and b) prom oting grow th of selected productivity-enhancing and im port-substituting capital-intensive industries, on grounds other than em ploym ent benefits.
O U R M A JO R FIN D IN G S A N D RECO M M EN D A TIO N S A RE A S FO LLO W S:
1. Betw een 1994 and 2004-i.e., since the end of apartheid-the South A frican econom y grew at an average annual rate slightly above three percent. A s seen in Figure 1 , this is a m ajor im provem ent over the country's dism al 0.9 percent average grow th rate over the last decade of apartheid. A t the sam e tim e, a three percent grow th rate is only about one percent faster than South A frica's average rate of population grow th. A s such, it w ill not, by itself, be adequate to deliver m ajor im provem ents in average living standards. Figure 2 show s the long-term pattern. If the South A frican econom y proceeded along approxim ately this grow th path for the next decade, it w ould not be possible for the G overnm ent to achieve its stated goal of reducing unem ploym ent by half by 2014. M aking reasonable assum ptions about labor force grow th and the proportionate rise of inform al versus form al em ploym ent, the report projects that continuing for the next decade at a three percent grow th rate and a one percent annual decline in labor intensity w ould produce an official unem ploym ent rate by 2014 in the range of 33 percent.
2. For the G overnm ent to achieve a 50 percent reduction in unem ploym ent by 2014 w ill require an aggressive em ploym ent-targeted program that increases both the rate of econom ic grow th and the labor intensity of grow th. H ow ever, even under an aggressive program such as this report describes, the unem ploym ent rate as of 2014 is still likely to be in the range of 15 percent. This m eans that other m easures besides em ploym ent grow th are needed to im prove living conditions for the poor. W e therefore support significant increases in governm ent social expenditures and incom e transfers, even w hile recognizing the large fiscal com m itm ents that the G overnm ent is already m aking in these areas. W e show how increased spending in these areas can be achieved through only m odest increases in the conventional sources of tax revenue. 3. The logic of the report's em ploym ent-targeted program is as follow s. It divides the South A frican econom y into tw o broad categories-subsidized and unsubsidized activities. The subsidized activities w ill be eligible to receive credit on concessionary term s, based on both a large expansion of the G overnm ent's current developm ent banking activities and a large-scale program of loan guarantees adm inistered by the private banking system . Overall, these subsidized activities should account for roughly 20-25 percent of all new investm ent spending in the South A frican econom y. Sm all-scale agriculture, sm all and m edium sized businesses, and cooperative businesses w ould all be eligible for this subsidy program . In addition, any other businesses could qualify for this subsidy if they could dem onstrate their capacity either to raise the labor intensity of output or to generate large em ploym ent m ultipliers. Som e of the activities that are likely to qualify for such subsidies are w ithin the industries identified by the prelim inary presentations of the A SG ISA program as 'priority' areas. These include agro-processing (such as biofuels) and tourism . W e estim ate that sectors receiving large credit subsidies should be capable of grow ing at an average annual rate of about eight percent through 2014.
The idea of providing subsidies for activities that are either labor intensive or capable of generating large em ploym ent m ultipliers builds on the approach of the current EPW P program . But the EPW P in its current form is too m odest in scale. A ccording to one estim ate, the public infrastructure com ponent of the program that is scheduled to receive 75 percent of the program 's total budget w ill generate roughly 80,000 net new jobs per year. A s of M arch 2005, creating a net increase of 80,000 new jobs w ould have led to a reduction in the unem ploym ent rate from 26.5 to 26.0 percent. 4. For the 75-80 percent of business activities in South A frica that w ould not receive credit subsidies, the report proposes that grow th of output should be accelerated to an average annual rate of roughly 4.5 percent through 2014. This is a rate that could be achieved through a fairly sm all relaxation of the G overnm ent's fiscal and m onetary stances-that is, a relaxation that w ill not create significant problem s either in term s of inflation or the exchange rate. If w e com bine the eight percent grow th rate for subsidized activities w ith a 4.5 percent grow th rate for the rem aining 75-80 percent of the econom y, the result w ould be an overall average grow th rate of 5.3 percent betw een 2005 and 2014. W e note that this average grow th path over 2005-2014 is nearly identical to that being projected in the prelim inary presentations of the A SG ISA initiative. A ssum ing this grow th projection can be sustained over the next decade, and also m aking reasonable assum ptions about labor m arket grow th and the ratio of form al to inform al econom y jobs, this report estim ates that South A frica's official unem ploym ent rate could fall to roughly 15.4 percent by 2014. Table 1 below provides the basic assum ptions, data and calculations upon w hich w e generated our alternative estim ates of the unem ploym ent rate as of 2014.
TA BLE 1 Source: Calculations based on data in full study.
Total Em ploym ent and U nem ploym ent Rate in 2014 under A lternative Scenarios For Econom ic G row th and Labor Intensity
Note: A dditional A ssum ptions:. 1. Labor force grow th is 1.9 percent per year and 2. Inform al em ploym ent/total em ploym ent = 27 percent.
The report utilizes a series of conventional policy tools to achieve these objectives. These m easures w ill prom ote grow th, em ploym ent expansion and poverty reduction w hile m aintaining stability of inflation and the exchange rate.
Fiscal Stim ulus.
Because of the high levels of governm ent debt incurred during the apartheid era, the A NC governm ent understandably chose to establish a tight fiscal stance in the initial years of post-apartheid dem ocracy. The deficit as a share of G DP fell to a low of 1. 1 The prelim inary presentations of the A SG ISA program confirm continued support for a 3-6 percent inflation target. The prim ary policy instrum ent that the G overnm ent utilizes to control inflation is adjusting interest rates and, m ore precisely, raising interest rates to dam pen the inflationary pressures that m ight result from m ore rapid econom ic grow th. H ow ever, the South A frican econom y has been paying a significant price in term s of slow er grow th of output and em ploym ent through its com m itm ent to high interest rates. Both business investm ent and household consum ption could increase if interest rates w ere allow ed to fall.
Considering these and other channels of influence in a vector autoregression econom etric m odel, the report finds, overall, that low ering the nom inal prim e lending rate by one percentage point and holding it at that low er level for five years w ould increase G DP grow th by about 0.15 percentage points per year. For exam ple, starting from a G DP grow th rate of 3.0 percent and a nom inal prim e rate of 11 percent, if the prim e rate fell to 10 percent and w ere held at that level for five years, the average rate of G DP grow th over the five-year period w ould rise to 3.15 percent. A t the sam e tim e, the corresponding rise in inflation w ould be relatively m odest, increasing inflation from , say, a base rate of 5 percent to 5.2 percent. The rand w ould also depreciate over this five year period but, again, only by a m odest am ount, nam ely, falling on average by about 0.6 percent per year relative to the dollar.
Based on these rough estim ates, the report proposes that the Reserve Bank m aintain lending rates at four percentage points below their current levels, w hich w ould then raise the average G DP grow th rate from the base of three percent to som ew here around 3.6 percent over a five year policy tim efram e. The resulting effects on inflation and the exchange rate w ould rem ain relatively m odest.
H ow ever, the four percentage point decline in lending rates w ould not, by itself, induce an adequate increase in econom ic grow th for the 75-80 percent of the econom y that is not receiving credit subsidies. But in our judgm ent, allow ing the fiscal deficit to rise to roughly three percent of G DP should provide the rem aining stim ulus to m ove the unsubsidized segm ents of the South A frican econom y to the target 4.5 percent grow th path.
Public Credit A llocation and D evelopm ent B anking.
The key m echanism through w hich the report proposes to generate an eight percent grow th stim ulus for 20-25 percent of the econom y is to provide credit on a subsidized basis. W e develop a form ula for establishing an appropriate subsidized interest rate, based on 1) the proportion of a loan that the G overnm ent is guaranteeing and 2) the difference betw een m arket interest rates and governm ent bond rates that have no default risk.
The report proposes three m ain policy tools to channel credit to the targeted industries at concessionary rates.
1. A major expansion in the lending activity and developmental focus of the country's currently operating development banks. The Industrial Developm ent Corporation is South A frica's largest developm ent bank. Its 2005 A nnual Report reported that through its lending activity over 2004-05, it anticipated creating 16,700 jobs. But this is far too m odest a contribution for such an im portant institution, given that the official statistic of 4.3 m illion unem ployed people in 2005 is 257 tim es larger than this 16,700 figure. The capitalization of these banks therefore needs to increase and they should be allow ed to assum e a higher level of risk on behalf of an em ploym ent-targeted grow th agenda.
2. The establishment of so-called 'asset reserve requirements' for private banks and other financial institutions. A sset reserve requirem ents require that financial institutions hold a designated proportion of their assets in loans to priority areas or else hold the sam e proportion of their total assets in a sterile cash reserve account. For exam ple, applying our subsidy policy w ould stipulate that banks should hold 25 percent of their loan portfolio in designated subsidized activities. If the subsidized activities did not account for at least 25 percent of the banks' total loan portfolio, the banks w ould then need to cover this gap by holding cash. Features of this proposal are com parable to the system of 'prescribed assets' that operated in South A frica from 1956 to1989. H ow ever, this report proposes m easures to operate this system m ore flexibly-for exam ple, through allow ing banks that hold m ore than 25 percent of their loans in subsidized activities to sell perm its to institutions w hose targeted industries account for below the 25 percent m inim um of subsidized loans.
3. A major expansion of the G overnment's system of loan guarantees. For the G overnm ent's current loan guarantee program , the accruals on its contingent liabilities-i.e., the am ounts that the G overnm ent actually pays w hen loans default-have been a trivial cost, am ounting, on average, to 1/100 of one percent or less over the recent past. This report proposes the follow ing program : the G overnm ent underw rites about R40 billion per year in loans, i.e., a figure approxim ately equal to 25 percent of fixed capital form ation as of 2004. The report assum es a default rate on these loans of 15 percent and loan guarantees that cover 75 percent of the principal on defaulted debts. Under this scenario, it follow s that the accruals to the G overnm ent w ould am ount to R4.5 billion/year (i.e., R40 billion x .15 x .75). This is a crucial result. It show s that the G overnm ent has the capacity to underw rite a m ajor loan guarantee program , equivalent to roughly 25 percent of productive investm ent in the econom y, w ith a financial com m itm ent of no m ore than 1-2 percent of its fiscal budget.
Controls on Exchange Rates and Capital Flow s.
Exchange rate variability can create significant problem s for m onetary policy. Excessive depreciations could raise inflation rates, w hile excessive appreciations could generate lost output, profits and em ploym ent in som e industries. Variability itself can also be harm ful by generating m ore uncertainty and thereby possibly discouraging private investors.
A ll of these issues w ill becom e central if South A frica com m its itself to a m ore expansionary set of fiscal, m onetary and credit allocation policies-i.e., a set of m easures that could effectively support an em ploym ent-targeted program . Policym akers w ill of course have to take seriously the possibility that financial m arket investors m ight react negatively to such a program , and m ight sell-off their holdings of rand. Such a reaction could occur entirely as a result of a shift in investors' perceptions, regardless of w hether the fundam ental indicators of econom ic stability-such as fiscal deficits and the inflation rate-m ay change by only the relatively m odest am ounts that this report is projecting.
Capital controls, exchange controls and other capital m anagem ent techniques have been utilized as m echanism s for reducing the sensitivity of dom estic financial m arkets, including sensitivity of exchange rates, to m acroeconom ic policy. For South A frica, such m easures could potentially serve, at least, to partially insulate the econom y against any negative reactions by financial m arkets to an em ploym ent-targeted econom ic program . The key question for South A frica then is: to w hat extent and under w hat conditions can capital m anagem ent interventions enhance the autonom y of m acroeconom ic policy, including by helping to m anage exchange rates?
In our view , such m easures are capable, at least, of supporting efforts by the Reserve Bank to low er nom inal interest rates w ithin the range of about four percentage points that w e are proposing. In addition, severe bouts of exchange rate volatility w ill be less likely w hen capital m anagem ent policies are deployed to prevent such episodes. The fact that South A frica has a long history of operating exchange and capital controls enhances the prospect that such m easures could be used effectively to support a m ore expansionary set of fiscal, m onetary, and credit allocation policies. A t the sam e tim e, in part because such m easures are again becom ing increasingly com m on as a form of m acroeconom ic m anagem ent, they w ould not suggest that South A frica is m oving aw ay from its generally open interactions w ith global m arkets.
Inflation Control and Econom ic G row th. The G overnm ent clearly appears com m itted to the idea that m aintaining a low inflation environm ent is a necessary foundation for attacking poverty and unem ploym ent in a sustainable w ay. W e certainly do not advocate a high inflation rate or a relaxation of the inflation-targeting regim e as ends in them selves. H ow ever, the prim ary tool that the G overnm ent utilizes to control inflation is to m aintain high interest rates. By contrast, w e have advanced m easures to low er interest rates-both across the board, and also through providing concessionary borrow ing rates for industries w ith high em ploym ent m ultipliers. This report anticipates that a likely effect of such m easures w ill be for inflationary pressures to develop beyond the recent levels com m on under the inflationtargeting regim e.
The question that the report therefore exam ines is: how severe w ould be the costs to the South A frican econom y of allow ing the inflation rate to rise above its current target range of 3-6 percent? Recent research on this general issue had been pioneered by the late M ichael Bruno, w ho had served both as G overnor of the Bank of Israel and Chief Econom ist of the W orld Bank. In his 1995 W orld Bank study, Bruno analyzed the relationship betw een inflation and econom ic grow th for 127 countries betw een 1960 and 1992. H e found that average grow th rates fell only slightly as inflation rates m oved up to 20-25 percent. Of particular im portance for policym aking in South A frica, Bruno found that during 1960-72, econom ic grow th on average increased as inflation rose from negative or low rates to the 15-20 percent range. This is because, as Bruno explained, "in the 1950s and 1960s, low -to-m oderate inflation w ent hand in hand w ith very rapid grow th because of investm ent dem and pressures in an expanding econom y," (1995, p. 35) . That is, dem and-pull inflation, resulting from a process of econom ic expansion, w as positively associated w ith grow th as long as the inflation rate rem ained m oderate.
M any researchers have subsequently exam ined the issue, a m inority challenging Bruno's findings. This study developed its ow n m odel of the grow th-inflation relationship, w hose results broadly affirm Bruno's. A nd w hile a consensus has not been established on the issue, a few basic conclusions from the range of studies, including the one for this report, do seem w arranted. One is that, regardless of w hether researchers observe a negative grow th-inflation relationship em erging in the double-digit range for developing countries, there is only negligible evidence show ing a negative relationship betw een grow th and single-digit inflation. In addition, no researcher has challenged Bruno's point that the relationship betw een inflation and grow th w ill be different depending on w hat is causing the econom y's inflationary pressures. Thus, if South A frica pursues an aggressive em ploym ent-targeted program , one w ould expect that the inflationary pressures that m ight then em erge w ould not be harm ful to grow th, as long as policies m aintain inflation at a m oderate level.
But w hat happens if inflation accum ulates m om entum , such that a rise to, say, a 10 percent inflation rate leads to still greater inflationary pressures? Should South A frica then revert to raising interest rates, i.e., its standard policy tool at present for controlling inflation? In fact, tw o other policy tools are available for use. The first tool w ould be to pursue m easures that w eaken the m onopolistic pricing pow er that now characterizes som e sectors of the econom y. The second tool w ould be to pursue so-called 'incom es policies'. Incom es policies have been developed in various w ays across countries, but the basic idea is straightforw ard: w age and price increases are negotiated over an econom y-w ide basis betw een the organized sectors of labor and business. Incom es policies can also be beneficial m ore generally in im proving the efficiency of the country's industrial relations system and the im plem entation of its labor-law regulations.
The m ost basic critique of incom es policies is that in order for the approach to have any chance of success, it is necessary that w orkers achieve a high level of organization and that there be som e reasonable degree of com m on ground for negotiations betw een w orkers and business. Otherw ise, there w ould be no realistic prospect for econom y-w ide bargaining that could yield results that w ould be honored w idely. In the case of South A frica, a high degree of organization does exist both am ong sectors of the w orking class and am ong business interests. H ow ever, the relationship betw een unions and business is highly contentious. This could possibly dim inish to the extent that both sides recognize the obvious benefits of a program of accelerated econom ic grow th and em ploym ent expansion.
G overnm ent Spending Program s and Tax Policy.
Beyond providing a fiscal stim ulus, the G overnm ent obviously w ould play a crucial role in an em ploym ent-targeted program through its spending priorities and tax program s. The program s that this report is advocating w ould entail annual expenditures of R20-30 (in 2004 prices) , broken dow n as follow s:
1. Public investm ent in infrastructure: R5-7.5 billion 2. Incom e transfers and social support: R10-20 billion 3. Credit subsidies to businesses to prom ote accelerated em ploym ent grow th: R5-7.5 billion This report supports the idea of raising the structural fiscal deficit from tw o percent to three percent of G DP. If the Treasury did operate w ith this higher deficit, that alone w ould cover about R14 billion/year, i.e., roughly half of the total spending increase im plied by our high end figure of R30 billion. Raising the additional R16 billion w ould have to com e prim arily from m ore revenue. This w ould raise South A frica's tax revenue/G DP ratio from the 2004 rate of 24.7 percent to roughly 25.8 of G DP.
A n increase to a roughly 26 percent ratio w ould still place South A frica w ell below the ratios for low er-incom e OECD countries, such as G reece (45.1 percent) and Poland (41.8). It w ould also put South A frica roughly in line w ith a group of rapidly grow ing A sian econom ies, including Singapore (29.0 percent), Republic of Korea (28.4 percent) and M alaysia (22.2 percent). None of these other countries necessarily provides a particularly appropriate com parison to South A frica. But the key point is that neither the nearly 25 percent ratio at w hich South A frica currently operates nor an increase to 26 percent w ould establish South A frica as a significant outlier either am ong the OECD or A sian com parison groups.
Of the R16 billion/year that w ould need to be raised through additional revenue, the report argues that about R6 billion could be raised through increasing rates m odestly on the G overnm ent's three m ajor revenue sources, the personal incom e tax, the corporate profit tax and the VA T. H ow ever, the other R10 billion could be raised through three other sources. The first w ould be to extend the current Uncertified Securities Tax, w hich now applies only to stock trading, to the bond m arket as w ell. This is done in several com parison countries such as Brazil, Chile, M alaysia, and M orocco. W e conservatively estim ate that such a tax could raise roughly R6 billion per year. A second source w ould be enacting the M ineral and Petroleum Royalty bill that w as drafted by the Treasury in 2003. W e estim ate that this royalty w ould generate another R2.5 billion.
Finally, assum ing that the econom y's grow th w ould rise from a three percent trend to a 5.3 percent trend through an em ploym ent-targeted program , w e conclude that tax revenues of about R6.5 billion w ould result because of higher incom es. Such a rise in incom es w ill also bring reductions in the G overnm ent's expenditures on incom e support paym ents, given that em ploym ent w ill increase and poverty w ill decline. But in our calculations w e allow for only a m odest net fiscal contribution since the Treasury has already factored in a significant grow th dividend in its fiscal projections through 2008-09.
Policies for Productive Sectors. In addition to subsidizing activities for the expressed purpose of accelerating em ploym ent grow th, this report considers tw o other concerns w ithin the realm of sectoral policy. The first deals w ith the costs incurred through m onopolistic pricing pow er and the adm inistrative determ ination of prices. The adm inistrated prices of the parastatals -the publicly-ow ned utilities and econom ic services industries -are a case in point. Enterprises such as Eskom (electricity), Transnet (transportation), and Telkom (telecom m unications) provide essential inputs and services to sectors throughout the South A frican econom y. H ow ever, prices are poorly regulated and are not effectively coordinated w ith national policy objectives. Prices are often the outcom e of a process of negotiation rather than an integrated regulatory fram ew ork. For exam ple, large industrial users of electricity are able to negotiate m ore favorable rates than sm aller com m ercial enterprises. This effectively subsidizes the costs of production for larger firm s, at the expense of sm aller-scale users.
Such pricing practices therefore act to counter efforts to prom ote sm all enterprises and cooperatives. Sim ilar problem s w ith adm inistered prices exist for other critical segm ents of the econom y. For exam ple, the practice of 'im port parity pricing' enables steel producers to set prices at the international price plus tariff and transportation costs rather than at the price that w ould reflect dom estic production conditions. Such practices raise barriers to the success of an em ploym ent-targeted program . A t the sam e tim e, com m on blanket solutions, such as privatization, are not likely to resolve these problem s. M any of these industries are 'natural m onopolies' that require regulation regardless of w ho ow ns the assets. Thus, establishing a coherent set of such regulations w ill be critical to the long-term viability of an em ploym enttargeted program .
The second concern that the report addresses is that of prom oting som e industries even w hen their em ploym ent m ultipliers are w eak. Such m easures relate to both the m otor vehicles industry and the capital goods industry. W hile neither industry should be targeted for accelerated expansion on the basis of its em ploym ent m ultipliers, there are other grounds on w hich they should be prom oted. In particular, it w ould clearly be crucial over the next decade for the South A frican econom y to continue enhancing productivity and the capacity to produce im port-com peting capital goods. This is so even if policym akers rem ain focused on em ploym ent creation as their prim ary objective. Indeed, im plem enting an effective em ploym ent-targeted program should indeed enhance the capacity of policym akers to advance a broader econom ic policy agenda, since they can pursue other objectives-such as building a com petitive capital goods industry-w ithout neglecting the im peratives of job creation and poverty reduction.
N O TE
1. The CPIX consum er price index excludes interest rates on m ortgage bonds, w hich are included in the CPI m easure. The CPI m easure is the so-called 'headline' inflation rate.
